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I. INTRODUCTION
In-house counsel gets the pleasure of working more intimately with
their clients than would an attorney working at a law firm. This pleasure
manifests itself in many ways, but one of the best ways is when somebody
in the office stops by for a chat that quickly turns to a request for free legal
advice. In-house counsel could (and should) explain to that person what it
means to have the corporation, rather than an individual, as the client, and
that the company does not pay its in-house counsel to be a free legal clinic
to its employees. Still, as in-house counsel, and in particular, as in-house
intellectual property counsel, it is not unheard of for a young marketing
manager to knock on the door and eventually ask if the in-house counsel
could represent her in her divorce.1
It is easy for in-house counsel to laugh off such a request
(sympathetically, of course), especially in-house intellectual property
counsel. But what if intellectual property counsel should pay closer attention
to family law? What if the intersection of intellectual property law,
specifically patent law, and family law creates an odd, unresolved
conundrum that jeopardizes valuable company assets? What if—perish the
thought—in-house intellectual property counsel actually needs to understand
the employees’ rights in marital property?
It might just be so.
Consider this. Under U.S. patent law, ownership of a patent
automatically vests, as personal property, in the individual inventor.2 Many,
if not most, inventors are employees who, under some written obligation
(such as a routine employment agreement), assign their ownership rights to
the inventions created as part of their jobs to their employers. At the same
time, however, property acquired by a married individual (in most, if not all
states) is considered marital or community3 property of the married couple.
In that case, then, when an employee invents something and acquires an
interest in a patent (which acquisition occurs automatically upon invention
under U.S. law), doesn’t that patent first become marital property of the

1
Any reference to real-life events, or real-life young marketing managers with
seemingly troubled marriages, are purely coincidental.
2
35 U.S.C. § 261 (2018); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
3
The terms “marital” and “community” property are used interchangeably throughout
this article to refer to property acquired during the course of the marriage by either spouse
that is not otherwise excluded as “separate” property of the spouse under the state’s marital
laws. By contrast, we do not use these terms to imply that a community property regime or
jurisdiction is a distinct system with its own rules regarding the control and distribution of
marital property. Such a system is distinguishable from equitable-based common law
regimes. When referring to a community property regime or jurisdiction, we designate it as
such. These regimes will be discussed in greater detail in Part III of this article.
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couple before the employee assigns the employee’s interest to the employer?
In other words, how does an employer who receives an assignment from the
employee alone of only the employee’s interest avoid ending up owning the
patent jointly with the spouse who has his or her own undivided interest in
the marital property?
In this article, an intellectual property lawyer and a family lawyer will
explore this quirk in the law of patent ownership which creates serious
unresolved ownership issues for corporate patent assets. This article will
address the background of patent ownership from a federal patent law
perspective, including how ownership of a patent is acquired and conveyed,
and the peculiar but important difference between “legal” title and
“equitable” title to a patent. This article will then discuss concepts of marital
property, including how property acquired by one spouse during a marriage
can become jointly held marital property. This article will address whether
a spouse’s ownership interest in marital property acquired by the other
spouse (such as a patent invented by that spouse) is “legal” or “equitable”
ownership. This article will then address whether, if a patent is marital
property, a married inventor’s conveyance of his or her interest in a patent to
his or her employer is sufficient to convey the entire interest in the marital
property, or whether the company employer has received less title than it
thought. Having sufficiently stirred the pot, this article will attempt to
unravel the emergent problem and propose workable solutions.
II. PATENT OWNERSHIP AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that
Congress shall be entitled “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”4 The reference to
“inventors” has been interpreted to mean that only natural persons can be
inventors of a patent,5 and ownership of a patent initially vests in the
inventor.6 Each inventor can, however, assign all or a part of her interest in
her patent to another in writing.7 Joint ownership of a patent has also been
described as “tenancy in common” ownership.8 A patent is a right to exclude
others (as opposed to a right to do anything), and that right to exclude is
specifically the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, offering
4

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
Beech Aircraft, 990 F.2d at 1248.
6
Id.
7
35 U.S.C. § 261; see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1119–
20 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
8
E.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(Newman, J., dissenting) (patent ownership manifests the properties of tenancy in common).
5

SHULMAN & UPCHURCH (DO NOT DELETE)

4

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

10/17/2019 2:43 PM

[Vol. 50:1

for sale or import any patented invention.9 The owner of that right to exclude
can sue others who violate that right, or license someone to permit another
party to use that right. Identifying proper ownership of a patent, therefore,
is critical because only the owner of legal title to a patent has standing to sue
as a plaintiff to enforce the patent right.10 And, if there is more than one
owner of a patent,11 and one co-owner of a patent refuses to join a lawsuit,
the suit must be dismissed for lack of standing.12 Thus, a co-owner of a
patent who does not want to join a lawsuit, or who desires to license the
technology separately, can block the other co-owner from enjoying the
patent right. Further, the courts have specified that legal title is what matters
for standing, not equitable title.13 In brief, legal title transfers when someone
with an ownership interest actually conveys, in real time, her interest in the
patent to another. By contrast, equitable title might arise when a person is
under an obligation to receive title, but title has not actually been yet
conveyed.14 Of particular interest in patent cases, an agreement that an
inventor “will assign” her inventions creates only equitable ownership of the
purported assignee.15 A present assignment, however, such as that the
inventor “hereby assigns,” is sufficient to assign legal title.16 Legal title can
even be transferred in not-yet-created inventions through a present
assignment (i.e., “hereby assigns”) of an expectation interest, such as
inventions that will arise in the scope of future employment.17 In that case,
assignment vests legal title to the patent in the assignee the moment the
patent application comes into being, i.e., it is filed.18
III. FAMILY LAW AND OWNERSHIP OF PERSONAL PROPERTY: THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND EQUITABLE PROPERTY APPROACHES
TO MARITAL PROPERTY
In this section of the article, we provide an overview of family law
doctrines of property ownership, control, and dissolution during and after a
marriage. Specifically, while family law varies (sometimes radically) from
9

35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
See Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
11
This might occur if a patent is invented jointly; see supra notes 7–10 and
accompanying text.
12
Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891).
13
Arachnid, 939 F.2d at 1579–82.
14
Id. at 1578 n.3 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1486 (6th ed. 1990) (“Equitable
title may be defined as ‘the beneficial interest of one person whom equity regards as the real
owner, although the legal title is vested in another.’”)).
15
Id. at 1581.
16
Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
17
FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
18
Id. at 1573. As discussed infra, the court’s discussion of just how legal title vests
should be read carefully, especially in light of the present subject matter of this paper.
10
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state to state, this section notes trends among the states and highlights
doctrines that serve to inform the challenges that arise at the intersection of
family law and patent law when patent ownership is transferred during an
intact marriage.
Treatment of Marital Property During Marriage and at
Dissolution
For purposes of family law, different property regimes govern property
ownership and control during the marriage and at the dissolution of
marriage.19 Traditionally, states focused exclusively on title to determine
ownership and control of property during a marriage.20 Under the common
law doctrine of coverture, where the legal rights of the wife were subsumed
by the husband under a theory of unity, married women could not acquire
title to property on their own while married.21 Therefore, all property
acquired during marriage became the husband’s property, and he held title
to it.22 By the mid-nineteenth century, most states enacted married women’s
property statutes, which eliminated the doctrine of coverture, giving married
women the ability to retain title to property they acquired separately before
the marriage and to hold title to property during the marriage.23 For
determining ownership and management of marital property during
marriage, most common law jurisdictions still use a title system.24 This
necessitates determining how the property is held by the spouses, whether
that be in “joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, [or by] tenancy in
common,” to determine whether either spouse may dispose of the property
unilaterally.25 Moreover, spouses are able to retain title in their separate
property, typically property acquired before the marriage or property
acquired by one spouse during the marriage through gift, devise, or
bequest.26
19

DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 471–73 (3d ed. 2012).
Id. at 471.
21
Id. at 472.
22
See ROBERT E. OLIPHANT & NANCY VER STEEGH, WORK OF THE FAMILY LAWYER 466
(4th ed. 2016).
23
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 472.
24
See id. at 471–72; Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 75, 124 (2004).
25
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 472.
26
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.130 (West 2017) (defining separate property as “[a]ll
property of a spouse owned by him or her before marriage, and that was acquired by him or
her afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, descent or by an award for personal injury damages,
with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is his or her separate property.”); see also 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/503 (2019) (providing a more exhaustive definition of separate or non-marital
property as:
(1) property acquired by gift, legacy or descent or property acquired in
20
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At the dissolution of marriage, the traditional common law approach
followed the title system, awarding property to the spouse who held title to
the property.27 In practice, this often resulted in inequitable property
distributions, as the husband often held title to the majority of marital
property. This inequity led some states to adopt a community property
approach to marital property.28
Under a community property approach, spouses retain rights to
ownership and control of their separate property.29 However, spouses
acquire a one-half vested interest in all marital property, regardless of who
holds title to the property.30 In response to the advent of community property
regimes, traditional common law states also began to alter how they treated
marital property at dissolution of the marriage.31 While each spouse
continued to retain his or her separate property, the court would divide all
exchange for such property; (2) property acquired in exchange for
property acquired before the marriage; (3) property acquired by a spouse
after a judgment of legal separation; (4) property excluded by valid
agreement of the parties, including a premarital agreement or a
postnuptial agreement; (5) any judgment or property obtained by
judgment awarded to a spouse from the other spouse except, however,
when a spouse is required to sue the other spouse in order to obtain
insurance coverage or otherwise recover from a third party and the
recovery is directly related to amounts advanced by the marital estate, the
judgment shall be considered marital property; (6) property acquired
before the marriage, except as it relates to retirement plans that may have
both marital and non-marital characteristics; (6.5) all property acquired
by a spouse by the sole use of non-marital property as collateral for a loan
that then is used to acquire property during the marriage; to the extent that
the marital estate repays any portion of the loan, it shall be considered a
contribution from the marital estate to the non-marital estate subject to
reimbursement; (7) the increase in value of non-marital property,
irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital
property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or
otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection
(c) of this Section; and (8) income from property acquired by a method
listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection if the income is not
attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.).
27
See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 124.
28
OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 22, at 466 (discussing the evolution of marital
property laws in equitable distribution jurisdictions).
29
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 124–25. Community property states define separate
property in a manner consistent with common law states as property acquired by one spouse
before the marriage or during the marriage through gift, bequest or devise. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-211(A) (LexisNexis 2019) (defining separate property as “[a]ll property acquired
by either husband or wife during the marriage is the community property of the husband and
wife except for property that is: 1. Acquired by gift, devise or descent. 2. Acquired after
service of a petition for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment if the petition
results in a decree of dissolution of marriage, legal separation or annulment.”)
30
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 125; ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473.
31
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473–74.

SHULMAN & UPCHURCH (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

10/17/2019 2:43 PM

SPOUSAL RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS

7

marital property, regardless of title, in an equitable manner.32 As a result, at
the time of dissolution, community property and equitable distribution
systems operated in very similar manners.
A minority of states treat all property, separate and marital, the same at
the time of dissolution.33 Under this “all property” approach, there are no
legal distinctions between separate and marital property and the court is free
to divide property in an equitable manner to the divorcing spouses.34
Challenges to Treating Patents as “Property” Under Family Law
One challenge raised by this article is whether family law would treat a
patent as marital property irrespective of the regime it uses to determine
property ownership in marriage. Most state statutes use very broad language
to describe marital property.35 Moreover, when interpreting these statutes,
courts usually take a constrained approach in interpreting the exceptions to
marital property, excluding only that property which is specifically
designated as “separate” under the statute.36 As a result, most forms of
property acquired during marriage are considered marital (or community)
property. Despite the broad statutory definitions of marital property, courts
have rejected the application of marital property law in instances where it
did not serve the larger purposes of family law.37 For example, some courts
have provided a differentiated analysis of personal injury awards received
during marriage.38 In Hardy v. Hardy,39 the Supreme Court of West Virginia
looked to the reason for the personal injury award in determining whether it
could be characterized as separate or marital (community) property. In
instances where the award was to compensate for “pain, suffering, disability,
disfigurement, or other debilitation of the mind or body,” the court reasoned
that the award should be considered separate property.40 However, when the
award was to compensate for economic loss, “such as past wages and
32

Id.
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 476 (citing J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 3.03[2] (2011) and noting the all-property approach
adopted by Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming).
34
Id.
35
OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 22, at 468.
36
See OLIPHANT & VER STEEGH, supra note 22, at 468–69 (discussing the general
presumption contained in many equitable distribution jurisdictions that “all property acquired
legally or equitably during a marriage by either party is marital property”).
37
JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW, 387–404 (3d ed.
2005).
38
Id. at 404–06.
39
413 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1991).
40
Id. at 156; see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 405 (discussing the decision in Hardy
v. Hardy).
33
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medical expenses, which diminish the marital estate,” the award was to be
considered marital property.41
Courts have similarly struggled with whether to classify degrees or
professional licenses earned during marriage as marital property.42 In
rejecting the classification of a professional degree earned during marriage
as marital property, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Mahoney v.
Mahoney,43 emphasized the fact that the degree had an “uncertain and
unquantifiable . . . future monetary value.”44 This position, however, is not
uniformly embraced across the country. Most notably, New York has treated
a professional license as marital property. In O’Brien v. O’Brien,45 the New
York Court of Appeals explained that the New York equitable distribution
marital property statutes “recognize[] that spouses have an equitable claim
to things of value arising out of the marital relationship.”46
Finally, professional goodwill has received mixed treatment in family
law courts across the country. Some jurisdictions refuse to treat professional
goodwill as an asset to be distributed upon divorce, reasoning that it is only
valuable to an individual and “cannot be separately sold or pledged by the
individual owner[].”47 Other jurisdictions, however, recognize it as marital
property when it can be distinguished from the actual practitioner.48 Still
other jurisdictions treat professional goodwill generally as a marital
property, despite struggling with how to assign it value.49
Patents share some of the same challenges to marital property
classification as do personal injury awards, professional degrees and licenses
and professional goodwill. Because a patent is only a right to exclude, and
that exclusionary right may or may not exclude anything valuable, a patent
is difficult to value and may not create any economic benefit to the marriage
that would be subject to equitable distribution. However, unlike the
professional degree or professional goodwill, it can be transferred to another
individual or entity.50 Moreover, a patent might be considered unique to the
inventor in a way that is analogous to the way an individual loss is unique to
41

Hardy, 413 S.E.2d at 156; see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 405 (discussing the
decision in Hardy v. Hardy).
42
GREGORY, supra note 37, at 406–07.
43
453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 408 (discussing the
decision in Mahoney v. Mahoney).
44
Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 531.
45
489 N.E.2d 712, 715 (N.Y. 1985).
46
Id. at 715; see also GREGORY, supra note 37, at 409–411 (discussing the decision in
O’Brien v. O’Brien).
47
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343, 350 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981); see also GREGORY,
supra note 37, at 413.
48
GREGORY, supra note 37, at 413.
49
Id.
50
See supra Part II (discussing the transferability of interests in a patent).
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the injured spouse. As such, it might be defensible to treat a patent as
separate property of the inventor spouse in much the same way as the pain
and suffering component of a personal injury award is treated as the separate
property of the injured spouse. On the other hand, a patent’s potential to
generate an economic benefit that could be recognized by the marriage
would suggest that it is more closely analogous to the compensation for loss
of future earnings. In fact, most patents that are subject to valuation are
valued in the same way that a business would be valued, utilizing tools such
as the income method, cost method, and the cost of substitute technologies.51
Just as a business acquired during a marriage is routinely treated as marital
property (and valued at dissolution), so might a patent. In fact, in the few
cases that have addressed patent ownership in the context of marital
dissolution, courts have implicitly accepted the premise that patents could be
characterized as marital property.52 This approach seems appropriate given
the breadth of the definition of marital property and the fact that patents are
transferable and have the potential to generate an economic benefit that could
be distributed in a divorce action.
Management of Marital Property During the Marriage
While issues surrounding management of marital property during an
intact marriage do not arise with regularity in family law, these issues are
critical to understanding the dilemma this article presents. As the authors
will demonstrate below, the automatic vesting of patent ownership rights by
virtue of an assignment typical for most employment agreements actually
creates a problem of divided patent ownership if a spouse also
“automatically” acquires an interest in a patent invented during the marriage.
To understand whether, and to what degree, a spouse acquires an interest in
a patent (or patent rights) acquired during the marriage, we must understand
how marital property acquired during the marriage is handled. And, despite
the similarities in treatment of marital property at the time of divorce,
community property jurisdictions and equitable property jurisdictions have
divergent ways of handling the management of property during the marriage.
Those distinctions might be critical to the present dilemma.
In community property jurisdictions, spouses are “equal owners of all
property acquired during marriage, regardless of how the property is

51

See Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Protection
Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 467
(2007); Daniel E. Orr, How To Pick A Winning Patent, 21 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2017).
52
See infra Part IV (discussing the treatment of patents in marriage in the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals); Allan Woodworth, Note, Divorcing Ideas, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 487,
495–505 (2012) (discussing the treatment of patents and copyrights as marital property).
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nominally titled.”53 The spouses each have a one-half interest in the
community property.54 As a result, both spouses need to consent to the
transfer of community property.55 As will be demonstrated below, this
requirement creates an enormous potential ownership conflict if (and when)
a married employee assigns inventions created in the course of his
employment to his or her employer. By contrast, equitable property
jurisdictions retain the use of title to determine property governance issues.56
Therefore, the spouse who has title to the property could transfer the property
without consent of his or her spouse.57 Thus, where an employee is an
inventor, and, under the patent laws, is the individual title holder to the patent
right, he or she may be able to assign the invention to the employer without
creating an ownership conflict with the spouse.
These differences in how jurisdictions handle management issues
related to marital property highlight the challenge parties face in ensuring
orderly and predictable ownership of a patent. We turn to that in more detail
below.
IV. EXAMINATION OF PATENT OWNERSHIP DISPUTES AMONG EMPLOYEE,
SPOUSE AND EMPLOYER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Married employees who invent, and, therefore, acquire patent rights, in
the course of both their marriage and their employment, must serve two
masters. As demonstrated above, in community property states, property
acquired by the married employee during the marriage is immediately, upon
acquisition (or, in other words, upon invention) one-half owned by the
spouse who must consent to its transfer.58 At the same time, an employer
that requires its employees to sign a typical employment agreement stating
that the employee “hereby assigns” all rights to future company inventions
to the employer, expects to receive all such rights, without sharing ownership
with the employee’s spouse. So which master prevails? In this section, the
authors will discuss some of the most relevant case law to that difficult (and
still open) question.
The intersection between the laws of patent ownership, acquisition and
53

Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 125.
Id. at 124–25; ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473.
55
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473 (Spouses can provide written consent to each other,
empowering a spouse to have sole management decisions regarding the property.). See CAL.
FAM. CODE § 1100–1103 (designating the rights of spouses to control community property).
56
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 24, at 124.
57
This is of course subject to the nature of how the spouses hold title to the property.
For example, different management rules would apply if the spouses held the property in a
joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or by tenancy in common. ABRAMS, supra note 19, at
472.
58
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text (discussing community property rules).
54
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transfer, and the laws of marital property ownership, acquisition and transfer,
has arisen in a handful of cases. The first, and perhaps most extensive
discussion, of the topic was by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit59 in Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Communications, Inc.60 In that case, Mr.
Mundi Fomukong (“Fomukong”) conceived of and received two U.S.
patents during his marriage to Fonda Whitfield (“Whitfield”).61 About two
years later, Fomukong and Whitfield filed for a summary dissolution, or as
the court put it, a “quickie divorce,” under California law.62 Under a
summary dissolution under California law, the parties must attest that either
(1) they have no community property, or (2) they have a signed property
settlement agreement listing and dividing their community property and
assets.63 Despite the fact that the patents were acquired by Fomukong during
the marriage, and, therefore, were presumptively community property,
Fomukong and Whitfield filed for summary dissolution under the first
option, checking the box on the petition next to the statement: “We have no
community assets or liabilities.”64 Under California law, their “quickie
divorce” became final six months later.65
A few months later, Fomukong assigned the patents to a company he
had formed, Enovsys.66 Enovsys then sued Sprint Nextel for patent
infringement.67 Sprint Nextel moved to dismiss the claim for lack of
standing, alleging that Whitfield had obtained co-ownership of the patents as
community property under California law and that she had not assigned her
interest to Fomukong, or for that matter, Enovsys.68 The district court denied
the motion, finding that Enovsys had full title and that any ownership issue,
if there were one, would have to be resolved first in California state court.69
On appeal, the Federal Circuit discussed whether Whitfield had any
ownership interest in the patents at the time the lawsuit against Sprint Nextel
was filed. The court considered Sprint Nextel’s argument that the divorce
decree, which identified that the parties had no community property,
nevertheless failed to assign Whitfield’s interest, and that, therefore, she was

59
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals of cases arising under U.S. patent laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
60
614 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
61
Id. at 1336.
62
Id. at 1336–37.
63
Id. at 1337.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Enovsys, 614 F.3d at 1337.
67
Id. at 1337–38.
68
Id. at 1338.
69
Id.
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still a co-owner of the patent.70 On the other hand, Enovsys argued that the
divorce decree was a binding judgment under which Whitfield retained no
community property interest in the patents.71 The court agreed with
Fomukong.72
The court began by noting that ownership of legal title to a patent is a
matter of state law.73 The court acknowledged the presumption that “all
property acquired by a married person during marriage is presumed to be
community property.”74 Noting the presumption applied here, the court
made the following significant statement: “[p]rior to the divorce, the patents
were thus presumptively community property in which Whitfield had an
undivided half-interest.”75 Nevertheless, the court decided that the parties’
California state court divorce decree should be given preclusive effect, and
res judicata prevented re-litigation of Whitfield’s community property
claim.76
Although the spouse was not found to be a co-owner in that case, the
court’s decision plainly rested on the preclusive effect of the state court
judgment finally resolving community property issues post-divorce. But,
and most importantly for our consideration here, the court noted that “prior
to the divorce,” the spouse is entitled to an “undivided half-interest” in
patents invented by the other spouse.77 That leaves open the possibility that,
at least in a community property state like California, an employee’s spouse
may, in fact, own an “undivided half-interest” in a patent an employee
assigns to his employer.
Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc.,78 a case out of the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, is a case with similar facts, but a
different divorce decree, which turned out differently. In that case, James
and Mary Taylor were married February 14, 1987, and divorced March 7,
2011.79 During the marriage, between about 1993 and 1998, Mr. Taylor
conceived of, filed for, and received three patents.80 The parties’ divorce
settlement identified the three patents as the primary marital assets of the

70

Id. at 1341.
Id.
72
Enovsys, 614 F.3d at 1341.
73
Id. at 1342.
74
Id. (citing Weingarten v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 4th 268, 277 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002)).
75
Id. (emphasis added).
76
Id. at 1343.
77
Id.
78
No. 8:12-CV-746-T-EAK-AEP, 2013 WL 1798964 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013).
79
Id. at *1.
80
Id.
71
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marriage.81 The case did not address the reasons why Mr. and Mrs. Taylor
listed the patents as marital property, despite the undisputed fact of Mr.
Taylor’s sole inventorship (and, therefore, default legal title to the patent).
Pursuant to the parties’ settlement, equitable proceeds from the patents were
to be distributed 60% to Mrs. Taylor and 40% to Mr. Taylor.82 As best as
can be gleaned from the record, the fact that the patents were considered to
be marital assets was not in dispute, and we can assume the parties
considered that fact to be uncontroversial when the patents were listed as
marital property.
In April 2012, Mr. Taylor sued Taylor Made Plastics Inc. (“Taylor
Made”) for infringement of one of the three patents.83 Taylor Made moved
to dismiss the claim for lack of standing, arguing that Mrs. Taylor was a legal
owner of the patent and had not joined the lawsuit.84 Mr. Taylor argued that
the divorce decree did not grant any ownership interest and that, therefore,
Mrs. Taylor did not need to be joined.85
The court recognized that the threshold issue of standing required
examination of who owned legal title to the patent, and determined that
whether Mr. and Mrs. Taylor shared legal title required reference to Florida
law.86 The court noted that, under Florida law, property acquired during a
marriage is presumptively a marital asset.87 The court noted the framework
utilized by the Federal Circuit in Enovsys and analyzed the case under that
same framework.88 The court began with the proposition that a patent is
considered personal property under Florida law,89 and because the patent was
issued during the marriage, similar to the Federal Circuit’s statement in
Enovsys,90 it was presumed to be marital property “prior to the issuance of
the Divorce Settlement.”91 The court said, “[t]he Divorce Settlement merely
reinforced that presumption” by allocating equitable distribution of proceeds
from the patent.92 The court concluded that Mrs. Taylor had legal title to the

81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
Taylor, 2013 WL 1798964, at *1.
85
Id.
86
Id. at *2.
87
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)(1) (2012)).
88
Id. at *3.
89
Id. (citing Gulbrandsen v. Gulbrandsen, 22 So.3d 640, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009));
see also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the
attributes of personal property.”).
90
See Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
91
Taylor, 2013 WL 1798964, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2013) (emphasis added), aff’d,
565 F. App’x 888 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
92
Id.
82
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patent and dismissed the suit.93
In an unpublished decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit affirmed.94 The Federal Circuit noted that Mr. Taylor conceded on
appeal that Mrs. Taylor was co-owner of the patent.95 Mr. Taylor’s only
arguments on appeal were two unconvincing arguments about waiver, which
the court summarily dismissed.96 Interestingly, however, before addressing
Mr. Taylor’s arguments, the Federal Circuit noted in its brief, five-sentence
summary of legal principles that “a party is not co-owner of a patent for
standing purposes merely because he or she holds an equitable interest in the
patent.”97
In both cases in which the Federal Circuit considered patents as marital
property, the Federal Circuit noted the presumption that patents of one
spouse filed during the marriage were community or marital property of the
other spouse, at least until a divorce decree settled the matter differently.
There is no indication that the court at all considered the context in which an
employee had an obligation to assign his interest in the patent to his employer
(or anyone else) during an intact marriage. Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s
unpublished decision in Taylor was meant to provide a pragmatic “out” for
corporate America, namely, that marital property might be considered
equitable instead of legal title.
That “out,” if it exists, needs further exploration. The opinion, even
unpublished, seems to add nothing to the overall disposition of the case. It
could just as well have been a summary affirmation without opinion under
the Federal Circuit’s Rule 36.98 Instead, the court took the time to write an
opinion that did no more than dismiss the appellant’s cursory arguments
without discussion. It might very well be, therefore, that the Federal Circuit
was taking pains to point out the difference between equitable and legal title
in a patent to invite a deeper discussion of the nature of marital property (i.e.,
is marital property owned legally or equitably) next time around. While that
reading of the court’s decision is purely speculative, it does raise an
93

Id. at *3.
Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc., 565 F. App’x 888 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
95
Id. at 889 n.1.
96
Id. at 889 (criticizing Mr. Taylor’s arguments as “stated only in a cursory fashion
without any supporting facts”).
97
Id. (citation omitted).
98
See FED. CIR. R. 36 (“The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion,
citing this rule, when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion
would have no precedential value: (a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court
appealed from is based on findings that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence supporting
the jury’s verdict is sufficient; (c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or
judgment on the pleadings; (d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance
under the standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or (e) a
judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.”).
94
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interesting issue. As discussed above, the nature of patent ownership (i.e.,
legal or equitable title) is the critical inquiry in standing to sue.99 While that
distinction may not matter in equitable distribution states because there is no
automatic ownership by the spouse of property acquired while the marriage
is intact,100 it might matter in a community property state where the spouse
automatically acquires a one-half interest in property acquired during the
marriage.101 If the Federal Circuit were suggesting that, at least in
community property states, a spouse’s one-half interest in the spousal
inventor’s patent should be considered equitable, that might at least resolve
the thorniest standing issues. However, no state (to the authors’ knowledge)
has made that distinction. Furthermore, creating such a distinction as to
property owned during the marriage would create a second issue of whether
the nature of the title is altered when property rights are assigned at the
dissolution of the marriage.
If, in fact, the Federal Circuit were consciously wading into that
discussion, it would be curious for another reason. The courts have long held
that patent ownership is a matter of state law, not federal law. Thus, if
marital property is going to be considered equitably owned by a spouse
instead of legally owned, it would be up to the states to make that
determination, and such a determination would have to be made on a stateby-state basis. While the Federal Circuit may have posited one apparent
solution to the standing issue, it is not one over which it would have any
control, nor would it guarantee any degree of consistency. Perhaps the
proposed resolution by the Federal Circuit in Taylor is not such a resolution
after all.
Another clue as to how courts might resolve the conflict between
marital property and a spouse’s obligation to assign inventions to his
employer might be found in FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc.102 In
FilmTec, the inventor, John Cadotte, assigned his patent to his own company,
FilmTec Corp., and sued Allied-Signal for infringement.103 At the time
Cadotte made his invention, however, he was employed by an organization
known as MRI.104 The record on appeal did not include any agreement
between Cadotte and MRI; however, the work being done by Cadotte for
99

See supra Part II (explaining that only a party holding legal title to a patent has
standing to sue).
100
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 472 (discussing the use of title to determine ownership
during marriage in equitable distribution jurisdictions). Even in these jurisdictions, spouses
may acquire ownership of marital property during marriage through joint tenancy, tenancy by
the entirety and tenancy in common. Id.
101
ABRAMS, supra note 19, at 473.
102
939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
103
Id. at 1570.
104
Id.
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MRI was pursuant to a contract between MRI and the government, whereby
MRI “agree[d] to grant and d[id] hereby grant to the Government the full
and entire domestic right, title and interest in [any invention, discovery,
improvement or development (whether or not patentable) made in the course
of or under this contract or any subcontract (of any tier) thereunder].”105
Allied-Signal argued that the government, not FilmTec, was legal owner of
the patent and had not joined the lawsuit, requiring dismissal of the
lawsuit.106 The district court determined that the government had, at most,
an equitable title in the patent, and denied Allied-Signal’s motion.107
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded to assess proper
ownership.108 In its decision, the court laid out a number of principles that
may have bearing on our problem. First, the court addressed the issue of an
“expectant interest.”109 The court noted that patents, as personal property,
could be assigned between the time a patent is applied for and when it issues,
and that “legal title to the ensuing patent will pass to the assignee upon grant
of the patent.”110 Stepping back even further in time, an assignment of rights
“made prior to the existence of the invention . . . may be viewed as an
assignment of an expectant interest. An assignment of an expectant interest
can be a valid assignment.”111 At the time of the assignment, the invention
is non-existent, and, therefore, the assignee has, at most, an equitable
interest.112 But, “[o]nce the invention is made and an application for patent
is filed . . . legal title to the rights accruing thereunder would be in the
assignee (subject to the rights of a subsequent purchaser under § 261), and
the assignor-inventor would have nothing remaining to assign.”113 On appeal
the court noted that, “if Cadotte granted MRI rights in inventions made
during his employ, and if the subject matter of the . . . patent was invented
by Cadotte during his employ with MRI, then Cadotte had nothing to give to
FilmTec and his purported assignment to FilmTec is a nullity.”114 In the
court’s view, a present assignment of an expectant interest created an
automatic assignment of legal title. The court made this explicit later in the
opinion. Referring to the express grant from MRI to the government of
future inventions, the court said, “no further act would be required once an
invention came into being; the transfer of title would occur by operation of
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 1570–71.
Id. at 1571.
Id. at 1570.
FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1574.
Id. at 1572.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1572.
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law.”115 Without knowing what Cadotte’s agreement was with MRI, the
court could not determine whether MRI had obtained title from Cadotte,
which would then transfer automatically to the government, leaving FilmTec
with nothing.116
The court’s review of the record thus far was sufficient to require a
remand, but the court anticipated and discussed a related issue that might
arise. The court noted that historically a third-party purchaser of a patent
“for value without notice of an outstanding equitable claim or title” would
acquire “ownership of the patent” free and clear of any prior equitable
claim.117 The court then cited to 35 U.S.C. § 261, which provides that such
a bona fide purchaser cuts off the rights of a prior assignee who has not
recorded his assignment.118 The statute, the court concluded, went beyond
the common law to cut off prior legal ownership claims as well.119 In the
current case, the court referred to the district judge’s belief that FilmTec was
such a bona fide purchaser, because, notwithstanding the automatic
assignment under MRI’s contract with the government, that assignment was
never recorded.120 The court did not rule on that finding, but did caution the
district court on remand that a subsequent purchaser cannot merely be a
“donee or other gratuitous transferee,” but must have paid “valuable
consideration” so that he can “claim record reliance as a premise upon which
the purchase was made.”121 Finally, the court noted that Cadotte, as a
founder of FilmTec, may well have been aware of MRI’s obligation to the
government (if not his own obligation to MRI), making any claim by
FilmTec that it was a bona fide purchaser without notice dubious.122
FilmTec raises important issues for our current conundrum. First, it
suggests that if an employer pays value for an employee invention (and in
most states, employee wages and continued employment are considered
sufficient value to compensate for assignment of inventions made within the
scope of and during employment),123 the assignment from the employee to
the employer will be free and clear of any legal title claims that had not been
recorded. The bona fide purchaser rule, however, protects a purchaser
against an interest-holder who has failed to record the assignment of his prior
interest. In the context of marital property, though, the spouse’s interest may
115

Id. at 1573.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1573–74.
120
FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1574.
121
Id.
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Id.
123
See, e.g., Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 277 P.3d 81, 88 (Wyo. 2012) (also discussing
the issue in other states).
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arise automatically upon the other spouse’s acquisition of property; there is
no prior assignment to record. In addition, the bona fide purchaser portion
of the ownership statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261, by its terms only voids a prior
“interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or conveyance.”124 The
spouse’s interest, however, arises by operation of law as marital property and
is not the result of any “assignment, grant or conveyance” from the other
spouse. It does not appear that the recordation statute and bona fide
purchaser rule would help the employer. Second, FilmTec states that an
expectant interest vests automatically as soon as the interest arises.125 Thus,
if an employee makes a present assignment of future inventions, an employer
might argue that invention immediately vests in the employer automatically,
in essence, bypassing the employee. That circumstance pinpointed the
necessity in FilmTec to determine on remand whether such an agreement
existed. If such an agreement did exist, “then Cadotte had nothing to give to
FilmTec and his purported assignment to FilmTec [was] a nullity.”126
Carrying that analysis to the community property context, an
employee’s assignment might pass directly to the employer, and the
employee would then have “nothing to give” to his spouse. But again, that
fiction seems not to hold up to scrutiny. In community property states,
marital property is no less an “automatic” transfer from the employee to his
spouse than it is from employee to employer. Indeed, even after FilmTec,
the Federal Circuit in Enovsys (applying the laws of a community property
regime) stated that a spouse presumptively acquires an “undivided halfinterest” in marital property upon acquisition of that property.127 The race
for which “automatic” ownership interest arises first would have to be
decided as a matter of state law between marital property and employment
contracts.
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
Federal Courts Cannot Use Preemption to Resolve This Dilemma
The intersection between patent law and family law principles has the
potential to create an irreconcilable conflict in the area of patent ownership.
Patent law concerns itself with the distinction between equitable and legal
title; marital property laws ignore any such distinction because such
distinctions are irrelevant while the marriage is intact and immaterial to the
equitable division of property at dissolution. Patent law concerns itself with
documenting transfers of title in writing; marital law looks to the actual
124
125
126
127

35 U.S.C. § 261 (emphasis added).
FilmTec, 939 F.2d at 1572.
Id.
Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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effects of property transfer without regard to formality to avoid manipulation
of property distributions at divorce. The two legal worlds operate by virtue
of automatic vesting of title that appear to be unable to coexist. Patent law
automatically vests ownership of patents in inventors; marital law, at least in
community property states, automatically vests ownership of property in the
spouse.
Consider the following problematic scenario under current law. A
married employee has agreed to “hereby assign to Company all right, title
and interest in and to any inventions created in the course of my
employment.” Upon inventing a new product, for which Company files a
patent, Company believes that, by virtue of his agreement, and relying on
Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc.,128 it has full legal title to the patent. At the
same time, however, employee’s spouse, relying on community property
laws, believes she has a one-half interest in the patent. When Company sues
a competitor for patent infringement, the competitor moves to dismiss the
lawsuit, arguing that Company lacks standing because Company failed to
join the employee’s spouse as the other co-owner of the patent.129 A federal
court would be called on to resolve the standing issue and would have to
decide whether: (a) the assignment to Company “bypassed” the community
property rights of the non-inventing spouse; (b) if not, whether the noninventing spouse’s ownership were legal or equitable; or (c) if the spouse
would otherwise own legal title, whether federal preemption doctrine allows
the court to formulate special rules of patent ownership to override
community property regimes. The reasons a federal court might want to
utilize preemption doctrine to formulate such rules is evident. Imagine a
company with over 10,000 employees and thousands of patents, and at least
hundreds of those (if not more) invented by married employees in
community property states. Just how many co-owners of the company’s
patent portfolio are there?
Yet, the authors propose that a federal court would have difficulty
holding that, in matters of patent ownership, federal patent law preempts
traditional state laws of community property. First, marital law has long
been the exclusive province of the states.130 Even though patent law is
indisputably federal, and Congress’s power to enact patent laws derives
directly from the Constitution,131 that federal power would be challenged
were it to encroach on such traditional areas as family and marital property
128

211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
See Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
130
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 872 (2004)
(explaining that “[i]t is commonplace for courts and judges to assert that family law is, and
always has been, entirely a matter of state government”).
131
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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law. Second, patent law would find little help from preemption principles.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that matters relating to the
transfer of ownership of patents are essentially contracts for the transfer of
personal property, and are, therefore, governed by state law regarding
property transfer and contract.132 Thus, courts would have little chance
resolving a conflict based on the concept of field preemption, i.e., “federal
law leaves no room for state regulation and that Congress had a clear and
manifest intent to supersede state law.”133 Courts have long recognized that
states regulate patent ownership issues. A closer case can be made for
“conflict preemption,” which occurs when “a state law conflicts with federal
law such that compliance with both state and federal regulations is
impossible,”134 or when a challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of a
federal law . . . .”135 Here, however, it is not necessarily “impossible” to
comply with both laws; the outcome may just be undesirable.
The issue of trying to balance patent law and marital law is even more
complicated because the balance does not have just two sides of the scale.
Instead, the same conflict exists fifty-fold, with each state having its own
marital property laws that would need to be reconciled to create a cohesive
solution to the patent ownership/marital property problem. Given that
dynamic, the expectation is that a resolution would have to come at the
federal level. But, for reasons explained above, current federal law likely
does not preempt marital property law, even if the outcome is undesirable.
It would seem, therefore, a federal solution needs to be a legislative one.
Several are proposed below.
Proposed Modifications to the Patent Statutes
The operating assumption of this paper is that the patent ownership
regime needs fixing to accomplish two related goals: (1) provide
predictability, and (2) avoid the patchwork of state marital property laws.
One possible proposal would be for Congress to amend the patent laws

132
See, e.g., Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282, 285 (1902)
(“The rule is well settled that, if the suit be brought to enforce or set aside a contract, though
such contract be connected with a patent, it is not a suit under the patent laws, and jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court can only be maintained upon the ground of diversity of citizenship.”);
Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting cases
holding that state law governs patent ownership “long has been the law”).
133
Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687–88 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Elassaad v. Indep. Air, Inc., 613 F.3d 119, 127 (3d Cir. 2010)).
134
Id. at 688 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 635–36
(2011)).
135
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 330 (2011) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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to state that ownership of a patent vests initially in the inventor alone, without
regard to state law principles. This proposal is the likely (though not
necessarily strongest) argument to be made under current law, namely that
patents vest in the inventor alone, and because patent ownership can only be
transferred in writing, marital property principles are overridden. As shown
above in Part IV, however, it’s not clear those arguments would prevail in
every case, especially in the majority of states that operate under community
property regimes. And, such a law would not be without controversy, as it
would clearly have Congress invading an area of law long left to the states,
or at least instructing that such law be ignored in particular circumstances.136
An alternative proposal might attempt to thread the needle more
narrowly by incorporating equitable marital property distribution principles.
For example, Congress could amend the Patent Act to say that “an invention
invented by an inventor having an obligation to assign via written agreement,
who has received the benefit of that agreement during the marriage, may
fulfill that obligation on behalf of the marital property without accounting to
the spouse, so long as the inventor and spouse (a) were married prior to the
invention, (b) were married prior to the obligation to assign, and (c) were
continuously married through the date of conveyance from the inventor
pursuant to that agreement.” Additionally, the clause might say, “[a]n

136

There have been instances where Congress enacted laws that specifically overrode or
modified outcomes that would have otherwise occurred under state property laws. Most such
statutes involved maintaining consistency in retirement benefits of federal employees or
matters related to the U.S. Treasury. Those matters deal, at their core, with questions of
property and property distribution. For example, in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572
(1979), the Court considered the distribution of retirement benefits under a federal law that
conflicted with state marital property law. In that case, in California, a divorcing wife
received no interest in the decedent husband’s benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act of
1974, due to the federal statute explicitly stating, “the nonemployee spouse’s benefit
terminates upon an absolute divorce,” even though California state law would have
determined the retirement benefits as community property that flowed from husband’s
employment in marriage. Id. at 580. Addressing the preemption of California law by the
Railroad Retirement Act, the Court stated, “this Court has limited review under the
Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has ‘positively required by direct
enactment’ that state law be pre-empted. . . . State family and family-property law must do
‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will
demand that state law be overridden.” Id. at 581 (citing Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77
(1904) and United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)). In Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663 (1962), a widower claimed rights to a U.S. Savings Bond co-owned with his late wife,
over the claim of the late wife’s son who claimed interest under her will and community
property laws. Citing Treasury Regulations requiring a surviving co-owner to be “the sole
and absolute owner,” the Court stated that “[t]he clear purpose of the regulations is to confer
the right of survivorship on the surviving co-owner. Thus, the survivorship provision is a
federal law which must prevail if it conflicts with state law.” Id. at 668. It is not clear at all
that patent law is as much intertwined with matters of property and property distribution as
retirement benefits and ownership of U.S. debt.
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inventor for whom the above clause applies137 shall be deemed to have
assigned the full scope of rights described in the agreement.”
That proposal focuses narrowly on the largest undesirable outcome of
the conflict, namely, the uncertainty of corporate interests in their
employees’ inventions. This proposal, by its terms, would only come into
play if the inventor-spouse had an obligation to assign the invention and the
marital estate already enjoyed the benefit of that obligation (which may
include continued employment of, and therefore income to, the inventorspouse). From a marital property distribution standpoint, this proposal
accomplishes what is likely an already assumed outcome, i.e., that the noninventor spouse assumes his or her share of the fruits of the labor of the
invention.138 The further requirements of the proposal ensure that the
legislation would only apply to patent transfers that might otherwise be
impacted by marital property laws (in other words, the patents and the
obligation to assign arose during the marriage).
To see how this proposal would play out, consider a variation of the
facts in Taylor v. Taylor Made Plastics, Inc., discussed above.139 There, Mr.
and Mrs. Taylor were married in 1987, the inventions were conceived of and
patents received between 1993 and 1998, the parties divorced in 2011 with
a 60%-40% split of the patents’ proceeds, and Mr. Taylor sued a third party
for infringement in 2012.140 The court (affirmed by the Federal Circuit), held
that Mrs. Taylor was a co-owner of the patents, and the suit was dismissed
for lack of standing.141 But, consider if instead Mr. Taylor had assigned his
patents in writing in 2010 to the Mister Taylor Company, divorced his wife
in 2011, and the Mister Taylor Company sued a competitor in 2012. Under
community property laws and patent law as they presently exist, the outcome
might very well be the same as it was in the original case, because Mrs.
Taylor had a community property interest in the patents.142 Mister Taylor
Company’s lawsuit would be dismissed for lack of standing. Under the
authors’ proposal, however, assuming the Taylors both benefited from the
proceeds of the Mister Taylor Company during the marriage, (a) Mr. and

137

Or other appropriate self-referential language to be drafted as part of the statutory
amendment.
138
Cf. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the fruits of
the copyright vest in the marital estate under Louisiana law even if other individual rights of
the copyright vest in the author-spouse under the Copyright Act).
139
See supra notes 78–97 and accompanying text (discussing the decision in Taylor v.
Taylor Made Plastics, Inc.).
140
No. 8:12-CV-746-T-EAK-AEP, 2013 WL 1798964, at *1–3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29,
2013).
141
Id. at *7–8.
142
Setting aside the issue of whether, post-divorce, that interest were legal or equitable.
Let’s assume it was legal title.
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Mrs. Taylor were married prior to the invention in 1993–98, (b) Mr. and Mrs.
Taylor were married prior to his obligation to assign in 2010, and (c) Mr. and
Mrs. Taylor were continuously married through his conveyance in 2010.
Accordingly, under the authors’ proposal, Mister Taylor Company would
have full legal title to the patents and standing to sue.
Consider yet another, more likely scenario. Here, Mr. and Mrs. Taylor
are married in 1987. Mr. Taylor begins work at Acme Plastics Inc. in 1991
and signs an employment agreement assigning future inventions to Acme
Plastics Inc. He invents numerous patented inventions from 1993 through
1998, and during his employment the benefits of the employment accrue to
the marital estate. In 2011, he divorces Mrs. Taylor. In 2012, Acme Plastics
Inc. sues a competitor for patent infringement. Under community property
principles, the result is unclear at best because, depending on whether Mrs.
Taylor’s interest is legal or equitable, Acme alone may not have standing to
sue. Under the authors’ proposal, however, because Mr. Taylor had “an
obligation to assign [his inventions] via written agreement” and “has
received the benefit of that agreement during the marriage,” and because Mr.
and Mrs. Taylor “(a) were married prior to the invention [i.e., prior to 1993],
(b) were married prior to the obligation to assign [i.e., prior to 1991], and (c)
were continuously married through the date of conveyance from the inventor
pursuant to that agreement [i.e., from 1993 through 1998],” Mr. Taylor
fulfilled his obligation to assign to Acme Plastics Inc. without accounting to
Mrs. Taylor. Acme Plastics Inc. has full legal title to the patents (just as is
assumed today).
A legislative fix like the one above would intrude minimally on the
state’s traditional province of family law. While it does bypass certain
property ownership conventions at play in community property states by
providing a vehicle to nullify the automatic vesting of community property
in the non-inventor spouse, it does so while still preserving the primary
function of community property. In particular, the proposal above requires
the benefits of the agreement be conferred on the married couple (e.g., the
income of the employee-spouse who is obligated to assign his inventions to
the employer) before any assignment of rights voids the community property
rules. Additionally, and not insignificantly, it preserves the result that has
been the standard operating assumption to date, namely, that the corporation
has obtained full legal title from the employee-spouse.
Alternative Practical Proposal for Employers
At least until Congress acts to resolve the competing ownership regimes
of community property states and federal patent law, employers can
proactively ensure they own their employees’ inventions. One way an
employer might do this is to have the employee and the employee’s spouse
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consent in writing to the automatic assignment of future patent rights to the
company. In that case, the employee may sign the same present assignment
of future inventions as she does today. Her spouse, on the other hand, would
separately sign some other agreement to permit transfer of full legal title to
the patent. For example, the spouse may sign a power of attorney giving the
employee-spouse the right to transfer legal title of the invention from the
marital estate.143 Employers might consider adding a separate section on the
bottom of an employment agreement, after the employee’s signature, that
states: “I hereby assign to Company, as a condition of my spouse’s continued
employment, all right, title and interest, including all ownership interests,
legal or equitable, including community property rights, in and to any
Company inventions invented by my spouse, during our marriage, pursuant
to this agreement.”144
There are several possible impediments to implementing this solution.
First, as a purely practical matter (and a matter of maintaining marital bliss),
not every employee will want to have to present an employment agreement
to his or her spouse. Nor will every employee be willing (or able) to explain
why the spouse’s signature is necessary. It may look like an inappropriate
intrusion into an employee’s personal life. Second, to be properly
administered, the employer would have to update these agreements when
employees become married during their period of employment. This may
also be perceived as an inappropriate intrusion into employees’ personal
lives. Third, there is not really a good time to start implementing this type
of agreement. The moment an employer introduces this new form, it could
be seen as an admission by the employer that it might not have good title to
past inventions assigned under prior forms of agreement. Similarly, unless
the new form is executed by all married employees, those who don’t execute
the form (assuming that the employer then does not refuse employment to or
terminate the employee) may also create evidence of acquiescence on behalf
of the employer to the employee’s spouse co-owning the invention as
community property.
However, corporate implementation of new employment agreements is
143

Some community property states provide statutory limitations on the ability of spouses
to transfer community property, requiring, for example, that consent to be given in writing.
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123.230 (LexisNexis 2019). The fact that jurisdictions may enact
additional limitations on the spouses’ control of community property demonstrates the
challenge to employers navigating diverse marital property law.
144
Typical employment agreements define the scope of assignable inventions to be
limited to those developed by the employee in the course of the employee’s employment,
relating to the employer’s business, and developed using employer time or resources. See,
e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1060/2 (2019) (Illinois Employee Patent Act defining the proper
scope of employee inventions assignable to an employer). The authors have shorthanded that
definition above to simply “Company inventions,” with the understanding that that term
would be defined elsewhere in the employment agreement. Id.
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certainly manageable. For example, employees who take advantage of
employer health insurance are already on notice of the need to notify the
employer of life changes (such as marriage) to extend insurance benefits to
a spouse. Notifying the employer of marriage is, therefore, not seen (in
many, if not most, cases) as an inappropriate intrusion. At the same time,
implementing any new policy, or new forms, within an organization can be
administratively difficult, but often human resource departments manage
such changes on a regular (even if infrequent) basis as policies and regulatory
environments change. The largest, and perhaps most significant, risk,
however, is the perceived admission that prior inventions without spousal
assignments may still be subject to a spouse’s (or, in some cases, thenspouse’s) ownership interest. Since patents may have a term of fifteen145 to
nearly twenty years,146 a company may find it necessary to obtain corrective
assignments going back twenty years. Some employees (or their spouses or
ex-spouses) may not be easily locatable, or the interests may have passed to
others through assignment or inheritance. This risk, alone, might be
sufficient to have corporations continue the status quo in hopes that either
(a) their ownership is never challenged, or (b) if their ownership is
challenged, courts figure out a solution favorable to them in their particular
case.147

145

35 U.S.C. § 173 (term of a design patent is fifteen years from the issue date).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (term of a utility patent is twenty years from the filing date).
147
A company holding an older patent might, for example, make some sort of equitable
claim, like laches, to prevent a previously unknown co-owner from asserting ownership rights
after a period of years. There might be several problems with that argument. First, the patent
recordation statute, 35 U.S.C. § 261, is designed to address that circumstance in favor of a
bona fide purchaser. As discussed above, however, supra notes 124–125 and accompanying
text, § 261, by its terms, only voids a prior “interest that constitutes an assignment, grant or
conveyance.” The spouse’s interest, however, arises by operation of law as marital property
and is not the result of any “assignment, grant or conveyance” from the other spouse. See
supra Part III.C (discussing the rights of spouses to community or marital property during
marriage). Courts may not be willing to create an additional bona fide purchaser exception
when Congress has already created one. See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prod. Aktiebolag v. First
Quality Baby Prod., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 961 (2017) (holding that laches could not override
the statutory six-year limitations period for bringing a patent lawsuit, stating, “[l]aches is a
gap-filling doctrine, and where there is a statute of limitations, there is no gap to fill.”).
Second, until a patent is actually enforced, or licensed, the owner of a patent need never reveal
himself. While a patent owner could conceivably bring a quiet title action to resolve an
ownership dispute, until either co-owner intends to make use of the patent somehow, i.e., to
exercise any of its rights, there would be no reason to do so. Third, at least under current law
(and so far as the authors can tell), spousal owners may not fully appreciate the rights they
may have in corporate inventions, and vice versa. Without prior awareness of his interest, it
would be difficult for a company to rely on equity to prevent a spousal co-owner from
announcing his interest in the patent.
146
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is a terrifying proposition to consider that thousands of patents,
perhaps hundreds of thousands of patents, may currently have uncertain
ownership.148 Corporations may have significant impairment of their patent
assets on their hands. In addition, savvy defendants to patent lawsuits may
have standing arguments available to quickly dispose of patent infringement
suits before they even get started. A fix is required. Courts may not be able
to do it, and it may be too late for companies to implement a strategy
effectively. Congress should act to legislatively resolve the undesirable and
unpredictable patent ownership outcomes occurring at the intersection of
marital property law and patent law.

148
According to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office statistics, there are approximately
500,000 issued patents with U.S. inventors. See Independent Inventor Utility Patents by
Country, State, and Year
(December 2015), U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, (Dec. 2015)
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/inv_utl_stc.htm
(extrapolating
data
through 2015 to current date). The U.S. marriage rate is approximately 50%. See also Kim
Parker & Renee Stepler, As U.S. Marriage Rate Hovers at 50%, Education Gap in Marital
Status Widens, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/09/14/as-u-s-marriage-rate-hovers-at-50-education-gap-in-marital-status-widens/.

